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COMES NOW, Appellant State of Idaho Department of Health and 
Welfare, by and through its counsel of record, Whitaker F. Riggs, Deputy 
Attorney General, and submits the following Reply Brief in the present case. 
1. ARGUMENT 
A. Medicaid Providers Are Not Entitled To The Same Due Process 
Protections As Medicaid Beneficiaries. 
The bulk of KMC's argument in its Respondent's Brief on Appeal rests on 
the supposition that KMC is entitled to the same due process protections enjoyed 
by Medicaid applicants and recipients. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 15, 17-3 1 .) As 
authority for its proposition, KMC cites Title 42, Chapter IV, Subchapter C, Part 
43 2 ,  Subpart E (42 C.F.R. §§ 43 1.200 et seq.) and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 US 254, 
25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970). As discussed more fully in Appellant's Brief on Appeal, 
42 C.F.R. $ 5  43 1.200 et seq. and Goldberg apply only to recipients and applicants 
of the Medicaid program; not to service providers such as hospitals. 
The Seventh Circuit provided a thoughtful analysis of the question of 
whether the due process protections enunciated in Goldberg and 42 C.F.R. $5 
431.200 et seq. apply to parties other than Medicaid recipients and applicants in 
Banks v. Secretary of Indiana Family and Social Services Administration, 997 
F.2d 231 (71h Cir. 1993). In the words of the Seventh Circuit: 
While subpart E defines the process that is due 
individuals seeking or receiving Medicaid benefits, 
its provisions in no way provide for notice and a 
hearing to a recipient either before or after a 
provider's claim for reimbursement is denied. 
Rather, the regulations cover an individual's initial 
and continued eligibility for Medicaid services - 
hence use of the terns "applicants" and 
"recipientsv- not provider reimbursement 
determinations. 
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Id at 243 (citing 42 C.F.R. 3 43 1.220 and O'Banrzon v. Town Court Nursing Cfr., 
447 US 773,786-87 (1980) (emphasis original)). 
In Banks, the Indiana Department of Public Welfare had refused 
reimbursement to a Medicaid provider for services rendered to Mr. Banks, a 
Medicaid recipient, shortly before his death. The Medicaid provider subsequently 
obtained a judgment in small claims court against the widow of Mr. Banks, for the 
amount in question. Mrs. Banks and another recipient then brought a class action 
suit against the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the state Medicaid 
agency because the latter failed to provide them notice and a hearing when their 
providers' claims for reimbursement were denied. While h e  petitioners were not 
providers themselves, the sources of authority upon which they relied, Goldberg 
and 42 C.F.R. $ 5  43 1.200 et seq., were the same as those relied upon by KMC in 
the cases at hand. In both cases, the analysis is the same. 
Banks makes clear that the due process requirements described in 
Goldberg, at least for present purposes, extend only to determination of a 
recipient? Medicaid eligibilig or covered services. 997 F.2d at 243 (citing 42 
C.F.R. $ 43 1.201). Thus, although the recipients in Banks had standing generally 
to claim the protections afforded by Goldberg and the applicable federal 
regulations, due process did not provide them relief since the state action in 
question was against a provider with respect to provider reimbursement, rather 
than against a recipient or applicant with respect to eligibility or a covered 
service. By analogy, KMC, as a provider, cannot step into the recipients' shoes 
given the facts that only the recipients have the relevant due process rights and 
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that the recipients admittedly have no claim against the Department. 42 C.F.R. 5 
43 1.201; see Banks, 997 F.2d at 243; Geriatrics, Inc. v. Ifarris, 640 F.2d 262, 265 
(loth Cir. 1981); Cervoni v. Sec'y, of Health, Ed and Welfare, 581 F.2d 1010, 
1018-1019 (1" 1978).) 
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has said that Medicaid providers have no 
property interest in Medicaid provider status. Erickson v. Uniled States e.x rel. 
Dep't ofI3ealth and Human Servs., 67 F.3d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1995). If providers 
have no property interest in status as a Medicaid provider, it is difficult to see how 
they could have a property interest in Medicaid reimbursement. Nor is a liberty 
interest at stake in these cases. A liberty interest is implicated if a charge impairs 
a person's reputation for honesty or morality. Id. There is no "charge" against 
KMC here, so neither the accuracy of the "charge" nor KMC's reputation is in 
question. Neither, in terms of the Vanelli test enunciated in Erickson, have the 
Department's reimbursement decisions resulted in an alteration o f  some right or 
status of KMC's that is recognized by law. Id. 
While KMC evidently acknowledges that it does not meet the test for a 
liberty interest as stated by the Ninth Circuit in Erickson, it urges that a distinction 
should be made between providers who seek to retain status as a Medicaid 
provider and those who merely seek Medicaid reimbursement. (See Respondent's 
Brief, p. 25.) Although it points to no specific page numbers within the decisions, 
KMC concludes that the Ninth and Tenth Circuits both "recognize a distinction 
between due process rights relative to status and due process rights relative to 
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claims for payment for services rendered." Id No such distinction was made in 
either case. 
As to provider reimbursement, the Geriatrics Court said: 
Eventide argues also that termination of benefits 
would force the Home to close and that it therefore 
has a significant financial interest to retain its 
certification. The Home's financial need for 
government assisted patients is incidental to the 
purpose and design of the program. . . . The 
unfortunate reality that it will probably encounter 
difficulty operating at capacity is not of 
constitutional significance. See Town Court 
Nursing Center, Inc. v. Beal, 586 F.2d 266 (3d 
Cir.); Case v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d 602, 607 (2d 
Cir.). 
Geriatrics, 640 F.2d at 265. Although the issue presented in Geriatrics was the 
timing of the hearing regarding Medicaid provider certification, the Tenth Circuit 
made clear that provider reimbursement claims are of no greater significance than 
provider status claims. Neither type of claim amounted to a protectable property 
interest. Id. at 264-65. 
The Erickson Court did not address reimbursement to Dr. Erickson in its 
opinion. However, in holding that physicians have no property interest in 
continued participation in Medicare, Medicaid or the federally-funded state health 
care programs, the Ninth Circuit stated that it chose to follow the reasoning of the 
First and Tenth Circuits. Erickson, 67 F.3d at 862. The cases from those circuits 
that the Erickson Court analyzed were Koerpel v. Heckler, 797 F.2d 858 (loth Cir. 
1986), and Cervoni v. Sec'y of Health, Ed and Welfare, 581 F.2d 1010 (1" Cir. 
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In reviewing fierpel, the Erickson Court stated: 
The Secretary argues that plaintiffs have no 
property interest in continued participation in 
Medicare, Medicaid or other related programs. . . . 
Presented with this precise issue in Koerpel v. 
Heckler, 797 F.2d 858, 863-65 (loth Cir. 1985), the 
Tenth Circuit held that a physician had no property 
interest in his eligibility for Medicare 
reimbursement. Heckler notes that the physician 
was not the intended beneficiary of the Medicare 
program and that, although he stood to suffer 
financial losses because of his exclusion from 
Medicare, such losses were "not of constitutional 
significance for the establishment of a protectable 
property interest." Id. at 864. 
Erickson, 67 F.3d at 862. In its consideration of Cervoni, the Erickson Court 
stated: 
Similarly in Cervoni v. Sec'y of Health, Ed. and 
Welfare, 581 F.2d 1010 (lS' Cir. 1978), the First 
Circuit concluded that Medicare is nothing more 
than a governmental insurance program for the 
elderly. "As such the real parties in interest are the 
beneficiaries; physicians are parties in interest only 
as assignees of the beneficiaries." Id. at 1018. 
Accordingly, the plaintiff physician had no 
protectable property interest in his participation in 
Medicare. Id. at 1019. 
Erickson, 67 F.3d at 862-63. Both Koerpel and Cervoni, the two cases upon 
which the Erickson Court relied in making its ruling that providers have no 
property interest in Medicaid provider status, involved provider reimbursement. 
Thus, if any distinction is recognized by the Ninth Circuit between due process 
rights relative to provider status and due process rights relative to claims for 
payment for services rendered, the distinction is that only a claim with respect to 
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provider status is of constitutional significance. KMC is not entitled to due 
process protection beyond that already provided for under Idaho law for its 
reimbursement claims. 
B. IDAPA 16.05.03.131 Provides A Mechanism For Petitioners To 
Present Evidence Not Previously Made Available To The Department. 
KMC asserts that it was deprived of due process protections to which it is 
entitled under Goldberg and 42 C.F.R. $5 431.200 et seq. when the hearing 
officer in each of the cases at bar ruled that she could not consider evidence 
beyond that which was made available to the Department or its agent, Qualis 
Health, before the reimbursement decisions were made. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 
18- 19.) This contention fails for several reasons. 
First, KMC is not entitled to the full gamut of protections to which 
beneficiaries are entitled, as discussed above. Second, IDAPA 16.05.03.13 1 
mandates that if an appellant "shows there is additional relevant information that 
was not presented to the Department with good cause, the hearing officer shall 
remand the case to the Department for consideration." KMC gave no indication 
before any of these hearings that it had or wished to present additional relevant 
information for consideration. Had it done so and given an adequate explanation 
as to why such information had not previously been provided, the hearing officer 
would have been obligated to remand the matter for further consideration in light 
of the new information. The Department would then have considered the new 
information itself, or referred it to Qualis Health for consideration, after which 
consideration a new decision would have been issued. At that point, if KMC 
wished to pursue its petition, the additional information would have been made 
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available to the Department, and the hearing officer would have been able to 
consider it at hearing. KMC, however, made no effort in any of these cases to 
obtain a remand so that any new information could be considered. 
Third, contrary to KMC's suggestion at page 18 of its brief, the hearing 
officer did take into consideration all the testimony offered by KMC's witnesses 
other than that which sought to introduce information not made available to the 
Department or Qualis at the time the reimbursement decisions were made. The 
hearing officer only rnled inadmissible, testimony "explaining and expanding on 
the details within the medical chart." (R., Ex. 5, p.21 (J.M.); R., Ex. 5, p. 23 
(J.G.); R., Ex. 5, p. 19 (T.K.).) It is apparent from the wording of her rulings that 
the hearing officer did take into account KMC witnesses' testimony about facts 
already in the medical records. It is also reasonable to conclude that she 
considered the KMC witnesses' opinions and arguments, since the reference to 
"details within the medical chart" suggests factual information; the kind of 
inforination the medical records needed to contain in order to demonstrate 
medical necessity for the dates of service in question. This understanding of the 
hearing officer's rulings is consistent with her decisions which, in each case, 
summarized KMC witnesses' testimony in her Findings of Fact. (R., Ex. 5, pp. 5- 
7 (J.G.); R., Ex. 5, pp. 5-7 (J.M.); R., Ex. 5, pp. 5-6 (T.K.).) 
KMC further asserts that, pursuant to Goldberg and 42 C.F.R. $4 43 1.200 
et seq., it "must be given the opportunity to appear personally before the official 
whose findings determine eligibility." (Respondent's Brief, p. 18.) As discussed 
above and in the Appellant's Brief, Medicaid providers have no such right, 
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without the peer reviewer's written consent. In fact, also as discussed in the 
Appellant's Brief; even Medicaid recipients have no such right. 42 U.S.C. § 
1320c-9; 42 C.F.R. $ 8  480.101(b)(l), 139; see also Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc. 
v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs., 444 F.3d 991, 995-96. Medicaid providers 
certainly do not enjoy due process protections greater than those afforded to 
Medicaid beneficiaries. 
C. KMC Was Not Entitled To Confront Or Cross-Examine the Peer 
Reviewer At Hearing. 
KMC argues that the district court correctly ruled that evidence of the 
findings and conclusions of the physician peers who reviewed the medical records 
in these cases for Qualis Health should he stricken from the record because it had 
no opportunity to cross-examine them. (Respondent's Brief, p. 19.) KMC bases 
this argument on the premise that under Goldberg and 42 C.F.R. §§ 431.200 et 
seq, due process encompasses the right to confront adverse witnesses. KMC is 
not entitled to those due process protections for the reasons discussed above and 
in the Appellant's Brief. Furthermore, also as discussed previously, the identities 
of Medicaid peer reviewers may not be disclosed without the reviewer's written 
consent. 42 C.F.R. 480 $8 139,480.101(h)(l). The district court should not have 
stricken the evidence of the Qualis Health physician peer-reviewers' findings and 
conclusions. 
KMC further urges that documentary and testimonial evidence with 
respect to the physician peer-reviewers' findings and conclusions should not have 
been allowed by the hearing officer, because such evidence was hearsay. 
(Respondent's Brief, p. 20.) In support of that suggestion, KMC contends that 
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insofar as I.C. $ 67-5251(1) and IDAPA 16.05.03.134 allow hearsay to be 
admitted at hearing, that statute and that rule conflict with Goldberg and 42 
C.F.R. $5 431.200 et seq. Again, KMC is not entitled to rely on these federal 
sources of authority to support its claim, and KMC has expressed no other reason 
why this Court should presume that the state statute and rule in question are 
unconstitutional as applied or on their faces. The hearing officer in each of these 
cases determined that the evidence in question was the kind of hearsay that was 
properly admissible under state law, and absent a showing of a violation of I.C. $ 
67-5279, the district court should have left her hearsay rulings in place. 
KMC offers that if the identity of a peer reviewer is to remain undisclosed, 
then the Department may not present evidence at hearing as to that reviewer's 
findings and conclusions. (Respondent's Brief, p. 20.) KMC cites no authority 
for this proposition other than its prior references to Goldberg and 42 C.F.R. $5 
431.200, et seq. The result of KMC's suggestion is that no state agency could 
ever present evidence of its peer reviewers' findings and conclusions at hearing, 
without presenting the peer for cross-examination. Thus, state agencies would 
likely be unable to defend any Medicaid reimbursement denial, since they would 
be unable to present any peer evidence to respond to the provider's expert. Such a 
result would make peer review useless and frustrate Congress' intent that 
Medicaid agencies conduct utilization review to ensure that tax dollars are not 
spent without limit. 42 U.S.C. §$ 1320c-3(a). 1320~-7(a); 42 C.F.R. $3 476.71, 
43 1.630. 
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KMC suggests that the Department may elect to require its QIO to retain 
only peers who agree to allow their identities to be released and to present 
themselves for cross-examination at hearing. This notion ignores the practical 
reality of peer review. The near universal reluctance of physicians nationwide to 
agree to perform peer reviews without a guarantee of confidentiality caused 
Congress to enact legislation guaranteeing confidentiality of peer reviewers' 
identities, unless the reviewer consents in writing to release of his or her identity. 
42 U.S.C. § 1320c-9; 42 C.F.R. $ 5  480.139, 480.101(b)(l); see also Pediatric 
Specialty Care, Inc. v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs., 444 F.3d 991,995-96. 
Lilce KMC, the Department would prefer to have the peer-reviewers 
present at hearing for testimony. Their presence would only enhance the 
Department's cases. However, because peer-reviewers are rarely willing to 
release their identities and to be available to present testimony, the Department 
must rely on hearsay in order to present those reviewers' findings and conclusions. 
Absent that, the Department would be unable to respond to evidence presented by 
providers' experts and would rarely be successful in defending its decisions not to 
fully reimburse providers. Such a result would be contrary to the federal mandate 
of Medicaid utilization review. 
At page 20 of its Respondent's Brief on Appeal, KMC states that at 
hearing, it is not interested in knowing the identity of the peer, per se; but, merely 
seeks the opportunity to "'cross-examine adverse witnesses."' One is left to 
wonder how KMC could conduct effective cross-examination of the peer 
psychiatrist without delving into the peer's background to the extent that his or her 
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identity would be revealed. In any event, the Department's QIO peer-reviewers 
exist to conduct independent, impartial reviews of requests for Medicaid and 
Medicare services or reimbursement and as such, do not truly qualify as "adverse 
witnesses". Therefore, even a Medicaid beneficiary would not have a right under 
Goldberg and 42 C.F.R. $5 431.200 et seq. to confront and cross-examine a peer- 
reviewer. 
Featherston v. Stanton, 626 F.2d 591 (7Lh Cir. 1980), is illustrative. In 
Featherston, the plaintiffs brought a class action suit against the Indiana 
Department of Public Welfare and the Marion County Department of Public 
Welfare, challenging the procedures for appealing the denial of dental and 
disability benefits, respectively. In both procedures, a hearing was conducted at 
which the plaintiffs evidence was submitted to the hearing officer, who then 
transmitted a summary of the evidence and tentative findings of fact to an initial 
review panel for review and evaluation. Id. at 592-93. 
The plaintiffs in Featherston argued that the initial dental and medical 
review panels were used by the state agencies as expert witnesses or technical 
advisors, and as such, the plaintiffs had a right to confront and cross-examine the 
members of those panels, pursuant to 42 C.F.R. 5 431.242(e). 626 F.2d at 593. 
The Seventh Circuit disagreed, holding that the initial review teams were not 
"adverse witnesses" as envisioned by the regulation. Id. The Featherston Court 
stated: 
Rather than functioning as adversaries to plaintiffs' 
claims, the initial review panels act as impartial 
assessors of plaintiffs' medical and social histories 
and as adjudicators of their entitlement to benefits. 
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This is the procedure established by those entrusted 
at the federal level with administering the Social 
Security Act, and it is correctly followed by the 
Indiana DPW. As the Supreme Court said in 
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389,91 S.Ct. 1420, 
28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971): 
The vast workings of the social security 
administrative system make for reliability and 
impartiality in the consultant reports. We bear in 
mind that the agency operates essentially, and is 
intended so to do, as an adjudicator and not as an 
advocate or adversary. This is the congressional 
plan. We do not presume on this record to say that 
it works unfairly. 
Id. at 594. Like the plaintiffs in Featherston, KMC seeks to cross-examine peer- 
reviewers who are not adverse witnesses. Even if Goldberg and 42 C.F.R. $$ 
43 1.200 et seq. did provide a mechanism for providers seeking reimbursement to 
claim the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, no such right 
exists here, where the reviewers are not adverse. 
D. KMC Lacks Standing To Assert Due Process Protections Under 
GoldbergAnd 42 C.F.R. §§ 431.200 etseq. 
KMC suggests that the Department argues that KMC lacks standing in 
these cases. (Respondent's Brief, p. 21 .) The Department has never put forth that 
notion. To the contrary, the Department has consistently recognized that KMC 
has direct standing to be a petitioner in cases where the Department has refused 
payment for Medicaid services rendered. The Department does however, contest 
KMC's assertion and the district court's ruling that KMC has thirdparty standing 
to represent its Medicaid patients in these cases. 
Since KMC already has direct standing to bring these cases, the only 
reason it would seek third party standing is to obtain the due process protections 
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that Goldberg and 42 C.F.R. $5 43 1.200 et seq. afford only to Medicaid recipients 
and applicants. KMC apparently recognizes that it cannot claim those protections 
as a provider seeking reimbursement. 
In contrast to the cases at hand, every case KMC has cited in support of its 
third party standing argument involved patients who themselves faced a loss of 
services. At pages 25 to 28 of its Brief, KMC cites Singleton v. Wu@ 428 U.S. 
106, 49 L.Ed.2d 826, 96 S.Ct. 2868 (1977), which dealt with a challenge to a 
statute that excluded from Medicaid coverage, abortions which were not 
medically indicated. The physicians had third party standing to challenge the 
legislation that affected the recipients' services. No such legislation or action 
affecting recipients' services has occurred in the instant cases, and there is no 
suggestion in the administrative record that the same controversy will arise over 
any future treatment by KMC for T.K., J.M. or J.G.-given the dispute's highly 
fact-specific character--or even that any hture treatment at all for those 
individuals is liltely to he provided by KMC. 
The same is true with respect to Pediatric Special@ Care, Inc. v. 
Arkansas Department ofHuman Services, 293 F.3d 472 (8th Cir. 2002), cited at 
page 28 of Respondent's Brief, which involved funding cuts related to early 
intervention services to recipients and a concrete threat of reduced services to 
recipients. Under those circumstances, the plaintiff group, which included 
physicians, was ruled to have standing to assert the recipients' claim for relief. Of 
similar ilk is Pennsylvania Psychiatric v. Green Spring HLT, 280 F.3d 278 (3rd 
Cir. 2002), discussed at pages 28-3 1 of Respondent's Brief. There, the plaintiffs 
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alleged that the defendant managed health care organizations impaired the quality 
of health care provided by psychiatrists to their patients by, among other things, 
refusing to authorize necessary psychiatric treatment. Id. at 280. Once again, 
representational standing was premised on an injury to patients; i.e., the plaintiffs 
were found entitled to stand in the shoes of the actually injured parties. KMC's 
patients here suffered no injury from the Department's actions; only KMC's 
grievance is before the Court. 
The lack of such patient injury is undisputed. Medicaid eligibility had 
been determined after discharge in the J.M. and J.G. cases, and only five days 
before discharge in the T.K. case. KMC's request for reimbursement came 
months after all three patients had been discharged. All three patients received all 
the care KMC deemed medically appropriate, and all three were discharged 
entirely at KMC's discretion, without input or interference from the Department. 
Furthermore, none of these patients can ever be billed by KMC for the services in 
question. 42 C.F.R. 3 447.15; IDAPA 16.03.09.079.08.c. There are, in sum, no 
shoes for KMC to step into for third party standing purposes, and, when relegated 
to its own shoes, KMC received all procedural process required by applicable law. 
E. The Federal Requirement Of Certification Is Not In Conflict With 
The State Requirement Of Documentation. 
On pages 3 1 to 32 of Respondent's Brief on Appeal, KMC argues that the 
documentation requirements of IDAPA 16.03.09.079.05 conflict with the 
certification requirements of 42 C.F.R. 3 441.152. As discussed in Appellant's 
Brief on Appeal at page 30, there is no conflict between this regulation and rule. 
The documentation requirements of IDAPA 16.03.09.079.05 merely require the 
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provider to demonstrate in writing that inpatient care continues to be required, as 
defined in IDAPA 16.03.09.079.01 generally, and IDAPA 16.03.09.079.01.b.ii 
and b.iii, particularly. 
42 C.F.R. 9 441.15 1 (a)(4) requires that inpatient psychiatric services to 
individuals under 21 be: 
Certified in writing to be necessary in the setting in 
which the services will be provided (or are being 
provided in emergency circumstances) in 
accordance with 8 44 1.152. 
42 C.F.R. 5 44 1.15 1 (a)(4). (Emphasis added.) That documentation must include 
evidence that: 
(1) Ambulatory care resources available in the 
community do not meet the treatment needs of the 
recipient; 
(2) Proper treatment of the recipient's psychiatric 
condition requires services on an inpatient basis 
under the direction of a physician; and 
(3) The services can reasonably be expected to 
improve the recipient's condition or prevent further 
regression so that the services will no longer be 
needed. 
42 C.F.R. § 441.152(a). Furthermore, the individual plan of care must be 
designed to achieve the recipient's discharge from inpatient status at the earliest 
possible time. 42 C.F.R. 3 441.154(b). 
The three criteria in 42 C.F.R. 9 441.152(a) are essentially the same 
criteria that are in IDAPA 16.03.09.079.01.b, all of which must be met in order to 
demonstrate intensity of service criteria, which in turn must be satisfied in order 
to demonstrate medical necessity generally, under IDAPA 16.03.09.079.01. The 
requirements of IDAPA 16.03.09.079.05 are: 
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a. Documentation sufficient to demonstrate the 
medical necessity criteria is still met; and 
b. A plan of care that includes documentation 
sufficient to demonstrate that the child's psychiatric 
condition continues to require services which can 
only be provided on an in-patient basis, including 
twenty-four (24) hour nursing observation under the 
direction of a psychiatrist or other physician 
qualified to treat mental disease; and 
c. Documentation sufficient to demonstrate the need 
for continued hospitalization, and that additional 
days at in-patient level of care will improve the 
recipient's condition. 
IDAPA 16.03.09.079.05. Since all of the criteria in IDAPA 16.03.09.079.01.b 
must be met in order to satisfy medical necessity, and since those criteria are 
essentially the same as the criteria in 42 C.F.R. Ej 441.152(a), there is no conflict 
with IDAPA 16.03.09.079.05.a and 42 C.F.R. Ej 441.152(a). Because the 
remaining two subsections of IDAPA 16.03.09.079.05 are virtually the same as 
subsections (2) and (3) of 42 C.F.R. Ej 441.152(a), there is no conflict between 
IDAPA 16.03.09.079.05. and 42 C.F.R. Ej 44 1.152(a). 
Nothing in federal or state law prohibits state Medicaid agencies from 
making rules that parallel and expand on federal regulations, as long as Congress' 
intent is not frustrated. Here, Idaho has merely clarified the certification in 
writing that must be done under federal law. Far from conflicting with the federal 
regulation, IDAPA 16.03.09.079.05 supports Congress' intent to ensure wise 
spending of tax dollars. 
KMC would have the Idaho rule declared invalid, so that it may follow its 
own definition of "certification in writing". Such a result would lead to lack of 
uniformity in certification among providers and would make utilization review 
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virtually impossible, thereby frustrating Congress' intent. Simply because KMC 
offers some writing and deems that sufficient to satisfy the federal requirements 
of certification does not mean that Idaho Medicaid must suspend its duty to 
conduct utilization review or must accept KMC's assertions on their face. The 
hospital has its obligations and the Department has its own. The obligations of 
one do not conflict with the other. 
F. In Each Case, Appropriate Care Could Have Been Provided In A Less 
Acute Setting. 
At page 34 of Respondent's Brief, KMC notes that the basis for non- 
certification of reimbursement for the dates of service in question for each case 
was that appropriate care could have been provided in a less acute setting. KMC 
asserts that there is no evidence in the record to support that determination and 
that the district court's ruling on that issue should be affirmed. Presumably, the 
ruling to which KMC refers is the ruling that the testimony of Dr. Lehman, the 
Department's only witness in these cases, should be stricken from each case in its 
entirety. (R., p. 270.) 
The district court first struck the Qualis Health peer-reviewer's findings 
and conclusions in each case, because KMC had no opportunity to cross-examine 
the peer-reviewer. In support of the ruling, the district court stated: 
The Idaho regulations not only give no opportunity 
for the provider . . . to cross examine the reviewing 
physician, hut those same regulations require the 
provider you [sic] cannot be known to whoever is 
challenging the reviewing physician's 
determination. Since there is a conflict on this issue 
between Idaho and federal regulations, the federal 
regulations are controlling. 
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Id The premise upon which the district court made its ruling was faulty. The 
source of authority that impedes cross-examination of a peer is federal law; not 
the Idaho rules. 42 U.S.C. 5 1320~-9; 42 C.F.R. 5 5  480.139, 480.101(b)(I). As 
discussed above and in Appellant's Brief, this ruling should be reversed. 
The district court then struck Dr. Lehman's testimony in each case, 
reasoning as follows: 
Dr. Lehman's opinions are not supportable, as he 
testified in each of the three cases that he had no 
idea what other less restrictive facilities there are in 
this area. Accordingly, his testimony is stricken as 
well. That leaves the testimony of the three treating 
psychiatrists in each of the three cases. 
(R., p. 270.) As discussed in Appellant's Brief at page 27, knowledge of the 
whereabouts and availability of local options for less intensive services is not a 
QIO function. Knowledge of such resources is a discharge planning function, 
attributable to the hospital. Lack of such knowledge on the part of a reviewing 
physician does not make his testimony inadmissible, particularly where, as in 
these three cases, the testifying physician was the first reviewer for the case and 
thus has intimate personal knowledge of the case. The district court should not 
have stricken the testimony of Dr. Lehman. 
T.K. 
Contrary to KMCts assertion, each of the records does contain evidence 
that appropriate care could have been provided in a less acute setting than an 
inpatient psychiatric hospital. In the T.K. matter, by the hospital's own admission, 
discharge planning was not even begun until the patient was determined to be 
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Medicaid eligible on December 9, 2005. In the words of KMC's witness, Dr. 
Miller: 
They agreed she was gravely disabled . . . and 
therefore they committed her to the Department . . . 
and . .. there was no bed available for her . . . at the 
State Hospital so she . . . had to stay at our facility . 
. . and as she began to slowly improve with time 
here in our facility there was nothing available until 
she did get her Idaho Medicaid, as I said in 
December, and then we were able to start to 
develop a discharge plan for her at that time 
because she had resources that made more options 
available to her. 
(R., Ex. 1, p. 23, LL. 12-21 (emphasis added).) It is evident from Dr. Miller's 
testimony that KMC could have initiated discharge planning sooner than 
December 9, 2005, had the patient had money to pay for care at a group home. 
Plainly, less restrictive appropriate care existed in the community for this patient 
throughout the dates of service in question. 
A delay in discharge due to inability to fund placement in a less restrictive 
setting is not among the elements of 42 C.F.R. 5 441.152, IDAPA 
16.03.09.079.01 or 16.03.09.079.05; and thus does not constitute medical 
necessity for purposes of Medicaid reimbursement. Thus, KMC may not certify 
the need for continued inpatient care on the basis that it is unable to secure 
appropriate placement due to lack of funding. As noted above, Dr. Miller testified 
that discharge planning was initiated as soon as fiinding for placement became 
avaiIable on December 9, 2005. By KMC's own admission then, T.K. did not 
meet the certification requirements of 42 C.F.R. 5 441.152(a) as of at least 
December 9, 2005, and thus, the last two days of the stay, December 13 and 14, 
are not reimbursable by Medicaid. 
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Nor does lack of funding for placement meet the "intensity of service" 
criterion found in IDAPA 16.03.09.079.01.b.iii. That rule states: 
b. Intensity of service criteria. The child must meet 
all of the following criteria related to the intensity 
of services needed to treat his mental illness: . . . 
iii. Treatment of the child's psychiatric condition 
requires services on an inpatient basis, including 
twenty-four (24) hour nursing observation, under 
the direction of a psychiatrist. . . . 
IDAPA 16.03.09.079.01.b.iii (emphasis added). As testified to by Dr. Miller, by 
at least December 9, 2005, T.K. was ready for discharge to a group home. 
Therefore, as of at least that date, T.K. no longer required services on an inpatient 
basis, including twenty-four hour nursing observation under the direction of a 
psychiatrist. In order for a patient to meet the continued stay criteria in IDAPA 
16.03.09.079.05, all of the criteria stated in IDAPA 16.03.09.079.01 must 
continue to be met, including subsection b.iii. IDAPA 16.03.09.079.05. Because 
inpatient care was no longer necessary by at least December 9, 2005, none of the 
continued stay requirements of IDAPA 16.03.09.079.05 were met after that date 
and Medicaid reimbursement for December 13 and 14,2005 cannot be made. 
The fact that 42 C.F.R. 5 441.152(a), IDAPA 16.03.09.079.01.b.iii and 
IDAPA 16.03.09.079.05 all require that 24-hour inpatient psychiatric care under 
the direction of a physician or psychiatrist be necessary demonstrates that 
Medicaid was never intended to pay for any portion of an inpatient psychiatric 
stay that is attributable to placement difficulties, unnecessary delay of treatment 
or any other reason than a psychiatric condition that cannot be treated in a less 
acute facility anywhere. 
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J. M. 
The dischargc of J.M. was delayed due first to the attending psychiatrist's 
desire to see the results of a psychological report, and then to J.M.'s 
argumentative behavior and use of marijuana while released on August 27, 2005 
temporarily to his mother's custody. (R., Ex. 1, p. 22, LL. 8-11; p. 24, LL. 10-17; 
p. 25, LL. 9-24; p. 26, LL. 1-12; R., Ex. 7, Ex. B, p. 15, 43-44 (J.M.).) The 
medical record shows that the discharge location for J.M. was always expected to 
be his home, and that he was discharged home, in the care of his mother. (R., Ex. 
7, Ex. B, pp. 43, 108 (J.M.).) Thus, there was always a less restrictive setting 
available for J.M., and he should have been discharged on August 25, 2005, as 
concluded by the Qualis Health reviewers. 42 C.F.R. § 441.152(a); IDAPA 
16.03.09.079.01.b, 16.03.09.079.05. 
J. G. 
The discharge of J.G. was also delayed due to the attending psychiatrist's 
desire to see the results of a psychological report, and to the attending 
psychiatrist's lack of communication with J.G.'s mother to get permission to start 
psychiatric medication. (R., Ex. 1, p. 26, L. 10 - p. 27, L. 16; R., Ex. 12,, Ex. C, 
pp. 43-44 (J.G.).) The psychological evaluation did not reach the attending 
psychiatrist until the day before discharge. (R., Ex. 12, Ex. C, p. 43-44 (J.G.).) 
KMC staff had contacts with J.G.'s mother while J.G. was at KMC, on or before 
December 24, 2005, on December 27, 2005, on December 30, 2005, and on 
January 2, 2006, but failed to coordinate a meeting between the mother and 
attending psychiatrist. (R., Ex. 12, Ex. C, pp. 43, 46, 53,89 (J.G.).) J.G. was 
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discharged back to the detention center from which she came, on January 4,2006, 
having received no psychiatric medication while at KMC. (R., Ex. 12, Ex. C, pp. 
10-1 1 (J.G.).) 
KMC was aware that J.G. was required to be discharged back to detention 
at all times during her stay at KMC. Since a less restrictive setting was available 
to J.G. and medical necessity no longer existed, she should have been discharged 
by December 28, 2005. The Qualis Health reviewers properly determined that 
delays due to psychological testing and failure to coordinate communication 
between the mother and psychiatrist are not contemplated in the criteria for 
inpatient psychiatric care of persons under 21 years of age. 42 C.F.R. § 
441.152(a); IDAPA 16.03.09.079.01.b, 16.03.09.079.05. (R.,Ex.12, Ex. C,pp. 
4-5.) 
G. KMC's Assertion That IDAPA 16.03.09.079.05 Is Arbitrary And 
Capricious Is Contradicted By The Records. 
J.M. 
KMC takes issue with Dr. Lehman's comment that J.M.'s release to his 
parent on a pass suggested that J.M. no longer needed inpatient care. 
(Respondent's Brief, p. 36.) The Qualis Health reviewers concluded that J.M. no 
longer needed inpatient psychiatric treatment as of, and should have been 
discharged on August 25, 2005. (R., Ex. 7, Ex. B, pp. 5-6 (J.M.).) KMC issued 
the pass on August 27, 2005. (R., Ex. 7, Ex. B, pp. 5-6, 43-44 (J.M.).) Since the 
pass was issued two days after the date the peer-reviewers determined J.M. should 
have been discharged, the pass was not a factor in the reviewers' determination. 
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Even if the reimbursement decision had been based on the pass, the rules 
do not state that anytime a patient receives a supervised pass, they, by definition, 
still require inpatient psychiatric treatment. The rules only provide that in order to 
fit the criteria for medical necessity, no unsupervised pass may be issued. IDAPA 
16.03.09.079.01.b.iii. A determination that medical necessity does not exist may 
still be made when a patient receives a supervised pass, if any medical necessity 
criteria are not present, as in this case. IDAPA 16.03.09.079.01. 
In any event, the decision by Qualis Health was based on the lack of 
evidence in the medical record that after August 25, 2005, J.M. was a danger to 
himself or others, or was gravely disabled, so as to require acute inpatient care. 
(R., Ex. 7, Ex. B, pp. 5-6 (J.M.).) As Qualis Health noted, there was sufficient 
information available to KMC to begin medication without such extended delay, 
and withholding medication while awaiting psychological testing results was not 
medically necessary. (R., Ex. 7, Ex. B, pp. 5-6 (J.M.).) This example by KMC of 
Qualis Health's findings and conclusions does nothing to support KMC's 
argument that IDAPA 16.03.09.079.05 results in decisions that are arbitrary and 
capricious. 
J.  G. 
KMC points out two instances in which J.G. told KMC staff that she had 
thoughts of self-harm. (Respondent's Brief, p. 37.) The instances occurred 3 and 
4 days after the date the reviewers determined that medical necessity for inpatient 
care was no longer evident. KMC apparently argues that it should be able to keep 
patients indefinitely after medical necessity no longer exists, just to be safe. 
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Neither Congress nor the Idaho Legislature intended such extended care at 
taxpayer expense. 42 C.F.R. $5 441.152(a), 476.71; IDAPA 16.03.09.003.040.b 
& 16.03.09.079.01. J.G. should have been discharged when the evidence of 
medical necessity no longer existed, on December 28, 2005, and readmitted, if 
necessary when medical necessity for admission was present. This is particularly 
so where J.G. was to be discharged to a secure detention facility that has a suicide 
watch program. (R., Ex. I ,  p. 25, LL. 17-23 (J.G.).) 
This patient needed psychiatric medication in order to improve her mental 
status. (R. Ex. 12, Ex. C, pp. 43-53 (J.G.).) However, no such medication was 
given. (R., Ex. 12, Ex. C, p. 10 (J.G.).) Such medication and the therapies 
provided by KMC during J.G.'s stay could have been provided in an outpatient 
setting. (R., Ex. 1, p. LL. 6-10; p. 22, LL. 10-15; p. 57, LL. 4-5, 12-17 (J.G.).) 
Further, JG. was discharged back to detention the day after her psychological 
evaluation was received by the attending psychiatrist, suggesting that the 
psychological evaluation had little or no impact on inpatient treatment or the 
decision to discharge. (R., Ex. 12, Ex. C, p. 43-44 (J.G.).) 
Finally, J.G.'s condition did not change during her stay. (R., Ex. 12, Ex. 
C, pp. 43-53 (J.G.).) The fact that J.G. was discharged in the same condition in 
which she was admitted corroborates the reviewers' conclusion that after the 
initial certified period of evaluation, ending on December 28, 2005, medical 
necessity for continued inpatient psychiatric care no longer existed. KMC cited 
no reason this patient could not have been kept safe in the detention facility after 
December 28, 2005, or why she could not have been readmitted, if need be, after 
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that date. Like the J.M. example, this example of Qualis Health's findings and 
conclusions does nothing to support KMC's argument that IDAPA 
16.03.09.079.05 results in decisions that are arbitrary and capricious. 
T. K. 
T.K. was admitted to KMC on November 6 ,  2005 and discharged on 
December 14, 2005. The dates of service for which KMC was reimbursed for 
services rendered to T.K. are November 6 ,  2005, to November 9, 2005, by 
Medicaid, and November 18, 2005 through December 12, 2005, by the 
Department, using state funds. Thus, the dates at issue in this appeal are 
November 9,2005 through November 17,2005 and December 13 and 14,2005. 
Qualis Health certified the first three days of the stay for evaluation, based 
on the evident need for an involuntary hold. (R., Ex. 1, p. 12, LL. 1-9; Ex. 11, Ex. 
C, pp. 5-6 (T.K.).) The certification ended when T.K. became a voluntary patient, 
on November 9, 2005. (Id.) The Department reimbursed KMC for services 
rendered from November 18,2005 through December 12,2005; the period during 
which T.K. was committed to the custody of the Department. 
KMC notes that the first physician-reviewer for this case, and only witness 
for the Department at hearing, Dr. Lehman, was not familiar with the civil 
commitment statutes in Idaho. (Respondent's Brief, p. 38.) That is not surprising, 
inasmuch as Dr. Lehman lives and works in Seattle, Washington; and inasmuch as 
Idaho's civil commitment statutes have no bearing on medical necessity 
determinations for Medicaid reimbursement for inpatient psychiatric services. 
Idaho's civil com~litment statutes are not referenced as criteria for Medicaid 
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reimbursement for inpatient psychiatric care in either federal or state law. The 
criteria for Medicaid reimbursement for inpatient psychiatric services are found at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 1396d(h)(l) and 42 U.S.C. 1320~-3(a)(l), 42 C.F.R. §lj 441.150 et 
seq. and 476.71(a), and IDAPA 16.03.09.003.040 and 16.03.09.079.01. Further, 
the Designated Examiner notes from the commitment proceedings were not 
included in the medical record for review by Qualis Health, and thus the 
reviewers had no opportunity to see the clinical diagnostic process that the 
Designated Examiners went through to arrive at their determination to commit 
T.K. Dr. Lehman's lack of familiarity with Idaho's civil commitment statutes is of 
no relevance to the case. 
KMC goes on to cite a number of instances when KMC staff members 
suspect that T.K. is hearing voices, then asserts that the refusal to reimburse KMC 
in the face of that evidence demonstrates that reimbursement determinations made 
by Qualis Health on behalf of the Department are arbitrary. (Respondent's Brief, 
pp. 38-40.) In addressing these instances of suspected auditory hallucinations at 
hearing, Dr. Lehman stated that documentation of such instances is a factor to 
consider, but that "chronic schizophrenics can hear voices and react to internal 
stimuli. And they are released to the street." (R., Ex. 1, p. 74, LL. 18-19 (T.K.).) 
Dr. Lehman stated further: 
In this case hearing voices is a concerning 
symptom, for sure, but it could be a symptom of 
chronic schizophrenia. People who are chronically 
schizophrenic can hear voices like for a very, very 
long time. But, they still, they live with it, they are 
treated for it. . . . But, in fact just hearing voices 
with no more delineation - are they telling her to do 
bad things, is this new hearing voices, are they - 
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have they changed in some way? I have no 
indication from that statement that this is acute or 
that it is different or grave. 
(R., EX. 1, p. 48, LL. 8-15 (T.K.).) 
T.K. was treated at KMC because she was considered to be gravely 
impaired. (R., Ex. 1, p. 27, LL. 1-23 (T.K.).) The medical necessity criteria for 
reimbursement for inpatient psychiatric services rendered to address grave 
impairment are contained in IDAPA 16.03.09.079.01.a.iii. That rule says: 
a. Severity of illness criteria. The child must meet 
one (1) of the following criteria related to the 
severity of his psychiatric illness: . . . 
iii. child is gravely impaired as indicated by at least 
one (1) of the following criteria: 
(1) The child has such limited functioning that his 
physical safety and well being are in jeopardy due 
to his inability for basic self-care, judgment and 
decision making (details of the functional 
limitations must be documented); or 
(2) The acute onset of psychosis or severe thought 
disorganization or clinical deterioration has 
rendered the child unmanageable and unable to 
cooperate in non-hospital treatment (details of the 
child's behaviors must be documented); or 
(3) There is a need for treatment, evaluation or 
complex diagnostic testing where the child's level of 
functioning or commnnication precludes assessment 
andlor treatment in a non-hospital based setting, and 
may require close supervision of medication and/or 
behavior. 
With respect to these criteria, Dr. Lehman testified: 
The - okay, the first. . . . I don't have evidence that 
that is fulfilled. The admit note describes . . . a 
person who doesn't want to answer questions and a 
person who can be hostile, although there are no 
quotes at all in terms of any element or anger or 
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words from her mouth . . . . In the number two, the 
onset of psychosis, severe thought disorganization, 
the acute onset - the first time 1 could find the word 
schizophrenia or psychosis in her chart was on 1218 
on the 1218 progress note . . . . Number three, need 
for treatment when it could not be done in a non- 
hospital based setting - again I have to read between 
the lines in the chart. I have somebody who I 
believe that were a different payment schedule had 
been arrived at earlier, in other words if she had 
gotten on Medicaid earlier than she did, that she 
possibly could have gone to an RTC earlier. 
(R., Ex. 1, p. 44, L. 16 - p. 45, L. 10 (T.K.).) Simply put, although details are 
required by IDAPA 16.03.09.079.01.a.iii, very few details were provided by 
KMC in its medical record to support a determination of medical necessity for 
this five-week stay. Without those details, the medical record could not meet the 
detail requirements in rule and reimbursement could not be certified. 
As discussed above, the intensity of service criteria found in IDAPA 
16.03.09.079.01.b were not met in this case with respect to the last two days of 
the stay, since that portion of the stay was solely due to the fact that placement in 
another facility had not yet been secured. Intensity of service criteria were also 
not met with respect to the period November 9,2005 to November 18, 2005. All 
of the intensity of service criteria must be met in order to establish medical 
necessity and justify Medicaid reimbursement. Consistent with his comments 
regarding severity of illness criteria, Dr. Lehman testified with respect to the 
intensity of service criteria in 42 C.F.R. § 441.152(a)(3) and IDAPA 
I do not believe I saw documentation to say that . . . 
there's a treatment plan saying that this patient was 
likely to improve from a 38-day stay. 
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(R., Ex. 1, p. 51, LL. 15-18 (T.K.).) Neither are 42 C.F.R. § 441.152(a)(2) and 
IDAPA 16.03.09.079.01.b.iii met here, since inpatient 24-hour nursing 
observation under the direction of a psychiatrist or physician is by definition not 
met when severity of illness criteria are not met. 
In sum, the medical record did not contain the detail required by rule to 
demonstrate medical necessity and thereby substantiate reimbursement for the 
dates of service at issue. As with KMC's examples in the cases of J.M. and J.G., 
this example of Qualis IHealth's findings and conclusions does nothing to support 
KMC's argument that IDAPA 16.03.09.079.05 results in decisions that are 
arbitrary and capricious. 
KMC suggests in Respondent's Brief at page 40 that the Department's 
reviewers might not have to rely on documentation as required by IDAPA 
16.03.09.079.05, if it contracted with a QIO that operated near KMC's premises. 
KMC does not explain why such a move would make the documentation 
requirements in IDAPA 16.03.09.079.05 unnecessary. The reviewers could not 
sit in with the attending in every Medicaid case in order to see precisely what 
occurs each day of service, even if the reviewer consented to release of his or her 
identity. As Congress has recognized, utilization review cannot be conducted 
without documentation. 42 C.F.R. 5 441.15 1(a)(4). 
KMC simply wishes not to be burdened with the documentation 
requirements of IDAPA 16.03.09.079.05 and relies on 42 C.F.R. § 441.152(a) in 
support of that notion. As discussed above, the documentation requirements of 
IDAPA do not conflict with the certification requirements in the federal 
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regulations, and KMC must comply with both in order to be reimbursed by 
Medicaid. Furthermore, KMC's assertion on page 40 of Respondent's Brief that 
Dr. Lehman "simply cannot be satisfied" is belied by the record. For example, in 
the T.K. hearing, Dr. Lehman responded to questioning by counsel for KMC as 
follows: 
Well, let me answer the question a different way. 
The number of times that I or any of my colleagues 
would decertify the final day of a mental health 
hospitalization is astonishingly rare. 
(R., Ex. 1, p. 80, LL. 19-21 (T.K.).) If KMC wishes to be reimbursed for its 
inpatient psychiatric services, it must include in its medical records the evidence 
of medical necessity described in IDAPA 16.03.09.079.01 and IDAPA 
H. Reimbursement Is Not Available At A Reduced Rate. 
At page 41 of Respondent's Brief, KMC makes an argument for 
reimbursement at a lower rate than the rate for inpatient psychiatric care, in the 
event KMC does not prevail in these cases. Idaho does provide for 
reimbursement to providers at a lower rate than inpatient care rates when inpatient 
care is no longer required, and when placement outside the inpatient facility is 
still pending. This period of time is referred to as Administratively Necessary 
Days (AND). IDAPA 16.03.09.400.01. That rule states: 
An Administratively Necessary Day (AND) is 
intended to allow a hospital time for an orderly 
transfer or discharge of participant inpatients who 
are no longer in need of a continued acute level of 
care. ANDs may be authorized for patients who are 
awaiting placement for nursing facility level of care, 
or in-home services which are not available, or 
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when catastrophic events prevent the scheduled 
discltarge of an inpatient. 
IDAPA 16.03.09.400.01. Although KMC refers in Respondent's Brief on Appeal 
to IDAPA 16.03.09.400.17 as the source of Idaho authority for a reduced rate of 
reimbursement, that rule applies to the Medicaid Utilization Rate (MUR), which 
is not a case-by-case reimbursement rate. The Idaho corollary to 42 C.F.R. 5 
447.253(b)(l)(ii)(B), referenced by KMC, is IDAPA 16.03.09.400.01, which is 
the applicable reimbursement mechanism for the period hospitals are seeking 
placement for inpatients who no longer need inpatient care. 
Had T.K. been awaiting discharge to a Medicaid-covered facility such as a 
nursing facility, ANDs might have been available for the last two days of her stay, 
in order to allow for orderly discharge. ANDs are not, however, available for 
group homes. Nor are ANDs designed to reimburse hospitals for dates of service 
other than those necessary to complete an orderly transfer or discharge of a 
patient. Thus, the Department cannot reimburse KMC for any of the dates of 
service at issue in T.K.'s case and cannot reimburse KMC for any of the dates at 
issue in J.M.'s and J.G.'s cases, 
Tallahassee Memorial Regiorral Medical Center v. Cook, 109 F.3d 693 
( I  lth Cir. 1997), relied upon as authority for KMC's position, lends support to the 
limits of the Department's AND reimbursement. In analyzing 42 C.F.R. 5 
447.253(b)(l)(ii)(B), the Tallahassee court stated: 
The history of this rule, taken together with the 
mandatory language of the Boren Amendment and 
the holding in Beasley, requires that the plaintiff 
hospitals be reimbursed for the "grace" days spent 
by adolescent psychiatric care patient in their in- 
patient facilities, when the sole reason for retaining 
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the patients in the upper level facility is the 
unavailability of alternative settings to which the 
patient may be discharged. 
Tallahassee, 109 F.3d at 703. Tallahassee did not state that a state agency could 
not limit its AND reimbursement to cases in which the patient is waiting for 
transfer or discharge to a Medicaid-covered facility, and Idaho has so limited its 
AND reimbursement. Nor has the Ninth Circuit required Medicaid to provide for 
AND reimbursement when patients are awaiting transfer or discharge to a facility 
not covered by Medicaid. Under Tallahassee, had T.K. been awaiting discharge 
to a Medicaid covered facility during her last two days at KMC, AND would have 
been available to KMC. She was not awaiting placement is such a facility, 
however, and therefore no Medicaid reimbursement may be made. 
Because placement was already secured in the J.G. and J.M. matters 
(detention and home, respectively), no AND reimbursement is possible in those 
cases, either. 
I. These Matters Should Be Remanded Only If It Is Determined That 
The Hearing Officer Should Have Considered The Entire Testimony 
Of KMC's Physician-Witnesses. 
KMC had the opportunity in each of the cases at bar to ask for a remand of 
the matter from the hearing officer to the Department, so that the psychiatrist- 
reviewers could consider any new or additional evidence that KMC wished to 
present. IDAPA 16.05.03.131. However, KMC made no effort to show good 
cause why such evidence was not presented to the Department or Qualis Health 
before the decision in question was issued, and in fact, has never articulated 
precisely what evidence it wanted considered. 
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KMC argues that as long as all the relevant evidence is available at 
hearing, a remand is inappropriate. (Respondent's Brief, p. 43.) Assuming that 
KMC believes it provided all the testimony at hearing in each case that it wanted 
to, then the Department does not disagree. The only reasonable basis for a 
remand to the Department is if the district court is affirmed in its ruling that the 
hearing officer should have considered all of KMC's witnesses' testimony. KMC 
argues that the hearing officer failed to consider some of KMC's witnesses' 
testimony in each case, so if the district court is affirmed as to this question, then 
the hearing officer should be given an opportunity to render her findings and 
conclusions with respect to that testimony. I.C. § 67-5279. Those findings and 
conclusions could alter the outcome of any of the cases. 
To support its position that none of these cases should be remanded under 
any circumstances, KMC points to Albert S. v. Department of Health, 166 Md. 
App. 726 (2006). Albert S. is distinguishable from the instant cases. First, the 
ALJ in Albert S. did not resolve the matter on the merits before remanding. 
Unlike the case in Albert S., the cases at hand were all resolved at the 
administrative level before proceeding through the court system. It is apparent 
that there is some testimony in each case that the hearing officer considered 
arguably irrelevant, because it consisted of information not made available to the 
Department or Qualis Health before the reimbursement decision was made. 
Second, since Albert S. was a recipient's benefits case, the decision rested 
on 42 C.F.R. $5 431.200 et seq., which is inapplicable in the cases at bar. If the 
district court's ruling regarding the hearing officer's consideration of all of the 
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testimony from KMC's witnesses is affirmed, then the cases should be remanded 
to the hearing officer for hrther findings and conclusions. 
KMC also cites Bonner General Hospital v. Bonner County, 133 Idaho 7, 
981 P.2d 242 (1999), in support of its argument that these cases should not be 
remanded. The holding in Bonner was that no further findings of fact could be 
made from the "paucity of evidence" that would affect the outcome of the case. 
133 Idaho at 11. Again, if the district court's ruling regarding consideration of the 
testimony of KMC's witnesses is upheld, then these cases should be remanded. 
Any testimony not previously considered by the hearing officer could conceivably 
affect the outcome of any of these cases upon remand. Therefore, the Bonner 
analysis is inapplicable in these cases. 
11. CONCLUSION 
The district court's judgments should be reversed in their entireties, and 
these matters should be remanded with instructions to dismiss the petitions for 
judicial review. Attorney fees and costs should be awarded to the Department, 
pursuant to1.A.R. 41, I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l), I.C. 5 12-117. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF- 34 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on August 12,2008, in accordance with I.A.R. 34(a), I caused 
to be served two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S 
REPLY BRIEF by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Michael B. Hague a U S .  Mail, postage pre-paid 
Paine Hamblen LLP Hand Delivery 
Attorneys At Law CT] Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested 
701 Front Avenue, Suite 101 Overnight Mail 
P. 0. Box E CT] Facsimile: 1208) 664-6338 
Coeur D'Alene, ID 83816-0328 CT] E-Mail michael.hague@painhamblen.com 
Legal Secretary 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF- 35 
